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Abstract: 
　The decision by the World Association of Zoos and Aquariums (WAZA) to expel its Japanese mem-
ber institutions that continued to support the dolphin drive hunts that take place within Japanese wa-
ters was presented by the domestic press as an external group misunderstanding a local practice and 
forcing its own outside values on others. The dolphin drive hunts themselves have been defended by 
the Wakayama prefectural government on a number of grounds. The following considers the justifica-
tions employed for the practice in the light of WAZA and other groups’ objections and finds the 
strongest of these defenses to be the claim to cultural relativism. This is then analyzed against the idea 
of moral realism – that there are standards that exist outside of any cultural group – and it is found 
that whether moral realism is accurate or not there are very compelling reasons to stop the drive hunts 
currently taking place.
Keywords:  cultural relativism; dolphin drive hunts; JAZA; mercury poisoning; moral realism; Taiji, 
Wakayama; WAZA
I.　WAZA, JAZA, dolphins, and confused editorials
　Japan＇s treatment of dolphins is unfortunately in the news again. The World Association of Zoos 
and Aquariums (WAZA) recently informed its Japanese counterpart (the Japan Association of Zoos 
and Aquariums (JAZA)) that it would be expelled from the group if it continued to patronize the Taiji, 
Wakayama dolphin drive hunts.1) This would be detrimental to JAZA members as WAZA provides 
many important zoo-related services and activities, such as animal exchanges, and so it was that the 
JAZA members voted in the majority to stop supporting the Taiji dolphin hunters, a decision that was 
not presented as happily made. It was, in fact, presented largely as an outside group bullying a poor, 
misunderstood local one by the mainstream domestic media. Both the Asahi Shimbun and the Main-
ichi Shimbun ran editorials stating that the Taiji dolphin drive methods are not cruel and that Japan – 
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as a nation, it seems – must do more to convince the outside world of the legitimacy of this ＇tradition＇, 
also lumping the affair in with the wider issue of Japan＇s killing of whales.2) There are numerous logi-
cal problems with the approach these two newspapers decided to take in their articles but it is not my 
intention to dwell here on media outlets＇ poor critical thinking, as important as that topic may be. 
WAZA advocates that animals in zoos and aquariums should be born and bred in captivity, not stolen 
from the wild and forced into a way of life completely foreign to them;3) the Asahi and Mainichi pa-
pers missed that point entirely but what they did focus on is instructive, and it signals where our atten-
tion is due. The real problem lies, as I see it, not only in the Taiji dolphin drive＇s methods, which are 
part and parcel of the annual dolphin hunts that take place using the same techniques, but more so in 
the mentality that is at the root of authorities＇ attempts to justify both the drive and the slaughter. Be-
fore we begin our analysis though, let me be clear that I do not wish to vilify Japan nor its many note-
worthy cultural practices; I wish rather to object to the idea that a cultural practice is justified merely 
because it is cultural, and that there are no applicable outside standards by which we may judge such 
practices. What I wish to argue against in the following is the idea of cultural relativism, that what is 
right for one group of people is right for them, and that anyone who is not one of them should have 
nothing whatsoever to say about the topic. This line of thinking is sometimes even extended to quell 
internal dissent, such that any person who is a member of the recognized group but disagrees with the 
majority should likewise be silenced; black sheep cannot be allowed to go ＇baa＇. To do this I will take 
issue with the common trope one hears repeated by those in government and the media in relation to 
Taiji and its dolphin related practices about their being misunderstood and unjustly criticized, a mantra 
that is born out of a mentality of victimhood. The topic is a very large one, however, and so to make it 
manageable we will limit ourselves to concentrating on an aspect of the question of moral realism – 
namely, are there substantive outside values that should be applied regardless of culture? – as it relates 
to the way those involved in the drive hunts treat dolphins. If moral realism is legitimate, how should 
we judge what those in Taiji and other areas do? If moral realism is not legitimate, what should be our 
response to the differing judgments about the drive hunts? These are the themes that will engage us.
II.　Taiji
　In order to understand the broader context in which the above conflict has arisen we will need first 
to review what is involved in the dolphin drives and subsequent slaughter, why such are thought to be 
cruel by those who oppose them, and what defense the community authorities in the prefecture give of 
the practice. The drives themselves consist of locating pods of dolphins at sea and, using a number of 
boats working in tandem, corralling them into a narrow cove where a net is then drawn across the 
width between the two shorelines, blocking any of the dolphins from escaping. The procedure is indis-
criminate, and so any number of very young individuals will be trapped along with their parents and 
the other members of the group. Some of the trapped individuals will be selected for sale to zoos and 
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aquariums (hence WAZA＇s decision), while the others will be killed by harpoon, sometimes taking up 
to thirty minutes to slowly bleed to death. Even being chosen for future entertainment purposes does 
not guarantee an individual dolphin＇s survival though as some of those selected for sale will die of 
shock before being loaded for transport. The official figures for the 2011-2012 season (the latest given 
at the time of writing; the season lasts from September to April) show that just in Taiji 899 dolphins 
were killed and 247 were removed for captivity while the nationwide quota for such drive hunts for 
the various dolphin species and small whales was set at 16,497 for the 2013-2014 season.4) Objectors 
note that dolphins are highly intelligent, have rich emotional lives, use a complex communicative sys-
tem that includes signature whistles specifying each individual (in other words, personal names), that 
death by harpoon is extremely painful and can be a very lengthy process as indicated above, that in 
their natural habitats dolphins can live into their forties or fifties but that more than 80% of captured 
dolphins die before turning twenty,5) and finally that dolphins are known to save human lives in the 
wild (e.g. from attacking sharks or from drowning). Moreover, those doing the killing in Taiji actually 
employ large curtains to shield what happens in the cove from the view of the public, indicating that 
even they acknowledge the practice would not be met with approval when it ceases being an abstract 
idea and becomes a blood-soaked butchery done before one＇s eyes. Dolphin meat that is sold in Japan 
(often labeled as whale) does not indicate the levels of mercury, methyl mercury, cadmium, DDT, and/
or PCB present, making the practice not only tragic for the dolphin individuals themselves but highly 
dangerous for any human individuals that consume the meat – particularly children.6)
　How is this justified by the local authorities? The Wakayama prefectural government＇s website has 
a helpful question and answer page listing their reasons in support of continuing the practice.7) Prima-
ry among the arguments made is that Taiji is a small town of about 3,500 people and relies on the in-
dustry to economically support itself. The approximately 400 year history of the practice is also 
stressed and it is asserted that to think that cetaceans are not food (unlike cows and pigs) is a mistake; 
in Japan they provide an important source of protein just like the catch of other fisheries. It is pointed 
out that dolphin hunting was not banned by the 1986 International Whaling Commission moratorium 
on whale hunting and a comparison is made to religious practices that proscribe the eating of certain 
foods but whose adherents do not insist that other people cease eating what their faiths stop them from 
eating. Another reason given is that cows and pigs have feelings too but in order to eat meat we must 
kill, and to the objection of mercury being found in dolphins＇ bodies it is responded that unlike that 
which is industrially generated naturally occurring mercury can be eaten within certain limits without 
one＇s health being adversely affected.
　All of these arguments can be very easily refuted save one, and we will briefly look at each of them 
in turn. Taiji is certainly not the first, nor will it be the last, small town whose local industry finds itself 
in need of updating, transforming, or being abandoned altogether. If the town wishes it could shift its 
focus to eco-tourism, promoting dolphin and whale watching rather than murdering or what amounts 
Journal of Regional Development Studies （2016）60
to a dolphin slave trade. It could also take advantage of national economic revival schemes and use 
the grant money to set up any number of ocean related businesses and practices that do not cause in-
ternational outrage, protestations, and petitions to immediately halt ongoing activities. I admit that the 
area probably does have a long history of spearing dolphins from vessels and from the shore, but I do 
not think the current practice of using motorized boats to corral entire pods into a tight cove, netting it 
off, and then stabbing each individual to death or binding him or her for sale to an aquarium has much 
of a lengthy tradition behind it. The question of scale enters here too; were Taiji fishermen to limit 
themselves to spearing dolphins from the shoreline the practice would still arguably be cruel but it 
would not come anywhere near the numbers we＇re seeing now (I would still think it should be 
stopped, though). The repeated comparisons to cows and pigs I think are actually somewhat reasona-
ble but for a conclusion that the Wakayama authorities would surely not draw: in my view we should 
stop eating them too, as I have argued elsewhere.8) Nevertheless, dolphins are not raised on farms in 
set numbers and fed regularly, nor are cows and pigs torn out of their natural habitats and made into 
performers, forced into a way of life for which they have not adapted. Moreover, it is hardly accurate 
to state that dolphin meat is an important source of protein in the Japanese diet just like ＇other fish＇ are; 
to do so is dishonest as dolphin meat is rarely, if ever, consumed by the vast majority of Japanese peo-
ple9) and it is to imply that a dolphin is just a fish and therefore not worthy of any more concern than 
the rows of packaged cuttings we see in the supermarket (for which, incidentally, we should also feel 
concern at least because of sustainability problems, but potentially other issues as well). It is true that 
dolphin hunting was not banned by the mentioned moratorium and that certain religions do have ta-
boos on some foods, but both arguments are disingenuous and false comparisons; the 1986 ban was 
on whales, not all cetaceans, and the continued way the two are lumped together in Japan (see the 
above editorials by the Asahi and Mainichi newspapers) seems to seek to create domestic support for 
dolphin hunting by casting Japan as being bullied at all turns and in need of circling the wagons. Ad-
ditionally, the tiny amount of Japanese people who do consume dolphin meat do not do so for reli-
gious reasons, nor are those who protest the drive hunts doing so in order to force religious values on 
the hunters. This does raise the important question of values though, and we will return to it in a mo-
ment. As for the levels of mercury being ＇natural＇ and ＇safe＇ (it is found in dolphins＇ bodies largely 
thanks to our pollution after all), aside from the challenge to the Wakayama government spokesperson 
to feed your own child such meat and put them at such risk and see how you feel it could be replied 
that actual tests found the amount of mercury present to be between ten to one hundred parts per mil-
lion, much higher than the national government＇s advisory of 0.4 parts per million.10) The one good ar-
gument that I see here that cannot be so easily refuted is the one referenced, albeit poorly and inappro-
priately, by the religion comment. Is this simply a case of outsiders forcing their values on others? 
And if so, is that not a conflict between modes of thought and manners of life? In short, isn＇t this an 
instance of cultural differences and therefore by asserting cultural relativism the case should be 
closed? That is the question that will occupy the remainder of our study.
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III.　Moral realism?
　The idea that there may be standards that exist outside of all cultures and that are species-wide mor-
al principles can strike the modern ear as being quite strange; it seems to have an anachronistic ring to 
it, to belong to a bygone era when people really believed in things and mostly stayed put in their coun-
tries of birth, long before any of the messy globalization that characterizes our era began. Thomas 
Nagel defines moral realism as moral or evaluative judgments being able to be explained by ＇general 
or basic evaluative truths＇ and the facts that are related to them; that evaluation, however, cannot in 
turn be explained by something else, it is instead similar to ＇physical truths, psychological truths, and 
arithmetical and geometrical truths.＇11) These are truths that we recognize as being valid in an ultimate 
sense without being able to pin down exactly why or how they are valid except by reference to their 
operation within the system in which we are employing them. (It may be recalled that even something 
like the basic principles of physics, which we typically consider to be fully understood, break down at 
the quantum level and a whole new set of rules must be introduced. Likewise Gödel＇s incompleteness 
theorem tells us that any mathematical system contains statements that are true but unprovable within 
their own system,12) yet we nevertheless consider both physics and mathematics to provide wholly 
true, reliable, and useful guides for our lives.) That we may find such judgments to be true in this way 
could be (must be?) related to our ability to reason, which almost certainly developed biologically out 
of our consciousness but which has now taken on collective cultural aspects as well, going from the ＇
perspectival form contained in the lives of particular creatures to an objective, world-encompassing 
form that exists both individually and intersubjectively.＇13) We use our reason to work out what these 
truths are, reflecting on values like pleasure and pain (which have clear biological origins and applica-
tions) and, starting from the determination that they are good and bad in themselves, we build up gov-
erning systems and moral principles.14) The process could be likened to discovering a material out of 
which a better house can be built; the material was there with us all along, we just didn＇t know what to 
do with it.
　The Wakayama prefectural government site claims that asking those in Taiji involved in the indus-
try to stop hunting dolphins is the same as asking them to throw away their way of life and that no one 
has the right to do that.15) This is clearly a cry for relativist values; must we really accept as valid the 
way of life that each individual person pursues? Are we powerless to judge one another or do our 
judgments carry no more weight than a mere private opinion? Given the above (admittedly brief and 
rough) picture of moral realism, which can be said to be the more accurate: the idea that behaviorally 
anything goes or some form of objective morality? Let＇s turn to our reasoning and intuitive reactions 
and examine some hypothetical situations to see if we can find out.
　Imagine that we read about a militant terrorist who poses no immediate threat to us on a personal 
level but who wishes to continue murdering and pillaging his enemies – whose very humanity he de-
Journal of Regional Development Studies （2016）62
nies –; would we not feel justified in judging his actions to be heinous? Would we not think it good to 
sign a petition or donate money for a cause that aims to halt such activities? Could we really say that 
no one has the right to tell him how to live? What if we now happen to meet him in person and he 
asks us in all sincerity whether or not he should keep at it? He＇s having doubts about the path he＇s on 
in life and would like to hear what we honestly think. I＇m certain that whether our terrorist is repentant 
or not nearly all of us would judge his actions in the same way and most definitely think that he 
should abandon his way of life.
　Similarly, what about a woman dealing heroin on the streets? Again, repentant or not we would 
judge that she too should give up her way of life. Moving out of the exclusively human realm, what 
about a poacher? Killing endangered rhinoceros and elephants for the sake of their horns and tusks 
only, leaving the rest of the body to rot in the afternoon sun? Or what about a gangster who breeds 
dogs in the most cramped and insanitary conditions imaginable, turning around and selling them to 
pet shops for a quick and tidy profit, the cost of which is passed on to the customers? It may be object-
ed that these are all criminal examples, involving crime directly or people involved in illegal activities 
or ways of life; yet why is it that we object to them? Merely because these things are against the law? 
Is there not a ＇something else＇ involved? Not a ＇legal stuff but also something else＇ but a simple ＇some-
thing else＇? We respond to these situations from a place that stands outside of cultural considerations. 
If these modes of being were legalized, if it were considered within the bounds of law to murder and 
pillage one＇s declared enemies, or to sell heroin, or to slaughter endangered species for their natural 
outgrowths, or to treat future family pets as unfeeling breeding machines, what would our reasoning 
and intuitions tell us? The answer is clear. These are activities that cause pain to sentient creatures, 
and it is pain of the order of being needless and gratuitous, and this has nothing to do with legal sta-
tuses. We don＇t have anything near the same intuitive reactions to traffic misdemeanors, despite their 
equal illegality. So what is it about the dolphin drive hunts that upsets nearly everyone that learns of 
them (a great many Japanese people but of course non-Japanese people too)? It is their indiscriminate 
nature, brutal killing method, the abuse of stealing an animal from a natural way of being and turning 
him or her into a prop for the profit of aquarium owners, but not least for the blatant disregard for 
public health by preparing and selling meat with mercury levels far above what the national govern-
ment has determined to be safe for consumption. (And, despite what may be considered ＇safe＇, who of 
us would want to eat a piece of meat with any levels of mercury in it at all?)
　There is a common response to all this, to the idea that there exist morals in a real sense, an objec-
tive sense, that are not determined by us, and this comes from Darwinian modes of thought. A (some-
what crude) example can serve to introduce this idea: When talking with students about their ethical 
ideas regarding clothing (place of manufacture, worker conditions, cost, etc.) I like to bring up the ex-
ample of fur. Nearly everyone says that we shouldn＇t kill animals to produce an item like a fur coat es-
pecially considering that synthetic materials will do just as well, but once a student said that it was 
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fine because human beings are stronger. I asked him if he would still think so if there were a race of 
aliens who enjoyed wearing human skin and for this reason kept people crammed together in tight 
cages until they reached a certain age, killed them, stripped them of their skin, and made the piece of 
clothing. To my surprise he replied that such would be completely acceptable if the aliens were strong 
enough to do that. Although I credited that student with consistency I found his line of thought very 
disturbing, as I＇m sure many readers will as well (perhaps even those familiar with the Nietzschean 
variant of this thought). Such arguments are not without antecedents though, for if there is a Darwini-
an explanation for why we have the judgments that we have, viz. our moral faculties have a biological 
underpinning based on beneficial evolutionary influences, then there is no reason to think of them as 
being true independent of our judgments.16) If we are simply talking about survival of the fittest, or 
likewise flourishing of the fittest, then the only considerations that enter into something like the Taiji 
dolphin drive hunts are sustainable management issues; how many dolphins can we capture and kill 
each year and not run out? 
　However, the Darwinian view represented here misunderstands what is meant by moral realism, 
and may also be conflating human – species specific – moral realism with universal – non-species 
specific – moral realism. Nagel writes that realist value ＇should not be construed in terms of an extra 
metaphysical component of the world, which exercises a causal influence on us. The features of the 
world that confer value and provide reasons are ordinary facts about the experiences of people, their 
relations to one another, and the implications for people＇s and other creatures＇ lives of different possi-
ble courses of action…it is through being recognized as reasons by a value-sensitive agent that they 
affect behavior.＇17) This is to consider what ought to be (be it a moral judgment, appropriate action, 
proper perspective, etc.) as a fact about what is, but a special kind of one.18) As we go through life we 
grow more aware of the best ways to live through our sensitivity to our world and those in it; yet the 
values that we learn are human values for humans and they are also pluralist in a species-specific 
sense. Being pluralist is not to say that they are relativist, however, it is instead to say that they are 
tied to a certain biological way of life,19) that these moral values we learn or discover involve a – in 
the fitting words of Peter Railton – ＇relational rather than absolute notion of goodness…[yet] the rele-
vant facts about humans and their world are objective in the same sense that such non-relational enti-
ties as stones are: they do not depend for their existence or nature merely upon our conceptions of 
them.＇20) These values exist because we do, but they still exist outside of us. Nevertheless, even if a 
Darwinian account were thought to be more accurate and moral realism nonexistent, the dolphin drive 
hunts would still be objectionable for the reasons already stated: their cruelty, indiscriminate nature, 
the fact that dolphins in zoos and aquariums can be (and should be, allowing that such should be con-
tinued at all (something I would also argue against)) bred in captivity, the lack of demand for dolphin 
meat and the obvious health hazards for the tiny number of people who actually do consume it.
　What, though, are we to do in cases where our moral judgments conflict, as in the present instance 
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where our conclusion about the Taiji dolphin drive hunts is at odds with the stated response by the 
Wakayama prefectural government? Philippa Foot has written that we should accept incommensura-
bility in some cases where moral judgments are found to be competing or even contradictory. There 
are times when we can say nothing or there is nothing to be said, and we need not always affirm all 
judgments or try to interpret them in a special way so that they come in line one with the other. In cas-
es where multiple appraisals are found such instances are not evidence against moral realism,21) they 
are simply one aspect of human life. Do we therefore find ourselves with nothing to say about this 
case? We do not, for as already shown above all of the prefecture＇s arguments for continuing the prac-
tice are either faulty, mistaken, or simply misleading. The one argument that seemed to show some 
promise, that of cultural relativism, has now also been shown to be deficient. There may be reasons 
for continuing the dolphin drive hunts but they are immoral reasons, and will be recognized as such 
by thinking individuals who care to examine the full facts of the situation. There may also be kneejerk 
nationalist reactions that insist the practice should continue, but such are not what Foot was referring 
to. Rather she appears to mean instances where all options have been determined to be at least poten-
tially morally valid (in the sense of what one ought to do) by each of the parties involved,22) such as 
whether it is more correct to arrive five minutes early for a meeting or exactly on time, whether men 
should hold the door open for women or, perhaps in the spirit of equality, whomever arrives first 
should hold the door for the other regardless of gender, and the like. Such cases are bound up with 
cultural practices and can be said to be relative; they are also clearly not worth arguing about. We do 
not need to insist that cultural relativism does not occur in any facet of human life and behavior, all 
we need to do is to show that the argument for cultural relativism is not a robust defense of the dol-
phin drive hunts currently being undertaken. It is not even a decent defense of the practice, as the 
above has attempted to demonstrate. Again, there may be some who continue to insist on arguing that 
what goes on in Taiji should continue ad infinitum but such arguments will not be based on sound rea-
soning and will serve only to continue immoral acts, demeaning to those who engage in them and 
tragic for their innocent victims.
IV.　It＇s high time to stop
　This is not the place to undertake a full accounting of moral realism, nor is the above meant to be 
one, but its principles do help us understand why the dolphin drive hunts are so clearly wrong to a 
great, great many of us – Japanese and non-Japanese alike. Those participating in the herding and kill-
ing, and they are not to be found only in Taiji, likely recognize this truth themselves and hence the ef-
forts involved to conceal the practice (or at least the details of it) from the public, such as using large 
curtains to block the view from the shore of what is going on in the cove as described above. Yet peo-
ple will often do what they themselves consider to be morally wrong, especially if they think that it 
can be hidden, or if it has been established over time, or if vested interests are involved, or some com-
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bination of all of the above. That we can ignore our moral judgments does not mean that they aren＇t 
there, however, and if moral realism is correct then standards exist beyond our mere individual or cul-
tural assessments, and they exist in a way that is both bound up with our humanity and outside it. We 
should not be surprised that Japan＇s treatment of dolphins garners such objections as those raised by 
WAZA and other groups, for on this issue the official Japanese position (even if it is not a popularly 
supported one) is far out of sync with international norms, based as they are on concrete moral judg-
ments. The drive hunts simply ought not to be, and no amount of appealing to cultural relativism can 
change that.
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太地町とイルカ漁問題：文化相対主義か道徳的実在論か
オバーグ・アンドリュー
　イルカ追い込み漁の継続を理由とした、WAZA（世界動物園水族館協会）による日本動
物園水族館協会（JAZA）追放の決定は、地域の慣習に対する外部団体の誤解と異なる価値
観の押し付けであると日本国内メディアによって報じられた。イルカの追い込み漁は様々な
理由に基づき地元和歌山県によって保護されてきた。本稿ではその慣習の正当化を WAZA
や他の団体の観点から考察し、最強の擁護は文化的相対主義の主張であると論じている。ま
た、道徳的現実主義が正確なものであろうがなかろうが、追い込み漁を中止させるに十分な
理由があるとするものである。
キーワード： 文化的相対主義、イルカの追い込み漁、JAZA、水銀汚染、道徳的現実主義、
和歌山県太地町、WAZA
